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I. INTRODUCTION: WHERE ARE WE AT?
During the floor debates of the Sixth Illinois Constitutional
Convention in 1969 and 1970, one of the questions most frequently
heard was “where are we at?” Any member of the convention who
was not certain of the debate’s posture—which issue was being
discussed or whether a vote was about to be taken or some other
parliamentary inquiry—would ask that question. The phrase was
a particular favorite of the delegates from Chicago, because the
question, with its unnecessary preposition at the end, was an
example of the Chicago dialect.
The convention met on December 8, 1969 and adjourned on
September 3, 1970. The people of Illinois voted to adopt the
proposed constitution on December 15, 1970. Therefore, in 2015,
forty-five years after its adoption, we can ask what has transpired
regarding the constitution. In short, where are we at?
In this issue, THE JOHN MARSHALL LAW REVIEW is
publishing a series of articles about the status of several major
changes wrought by the constitution. This essay is an introduction
to those articles and an assessment of the constitution’s treatment
of the major issues and controversies that the convention faced.
What did the framers think were the major issues of the day, and
how did they address and resolve them? How well have their
solutions worked in the last forty-five years?
Let us begin with 1968, when the people of Illinois voted to
call a constitutional convention. Under the constitution then in
effect, the 1870 Illinois Constitution, only the Illinois General
Assembly could place the question of a call upon the ballot. In
1
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1920, the Fifth Illinois Constitutional Convention met and
produced a constitution soundly defeated by the voters. From then
until 1966, the legislature had shown no desire to call a sixth
convention. While many in Illinois government and commentators
outside government decried the rigid, antiquated provisions in the
1870 Constitution, there was little agreement upon which changes
should be made. In 1966, the legislature proposed a set of
amendments to the Revenue Article, including the power to
impose a state income tax. The voters defeated those amendments.
However, also in 1966, a state representative named
Marjorie Pebworth died suddenly. She had been a strong advocate
of state constitutional revision. Some legislators thought that
placing the question of a call for a “con con” would be a way to
honor Mrs. Pebworth. A number of legislators who voted for the
resolution later said that they also assumed that the voters would
not adopt the call. Thus, partly to honor her and partly to dispose
of the “con con” issue by an up-or-down vote by the electorate, the
Illinois General Assembly placed the issue on the November 1968
ballot.
Those who favored major constitutional revision seized the
opportunity. They formed The Illinois Committee for a
Constitutional Convention. The committee represented a broad
spectrum: the political parties, the key political leaders, the
geographic areas of the state, and the major economic players in
industry, commerce, and agriculture. Only the labor unions were
reluctant to endorse a call. This was not unusual in states
considering a convention because organized labor feared the
insertion of right-to-work provisions and other anti-union
measures in state constitutions.
Fortunately for the committee, 1968 was both a presidential
election year and a gubernatorial election year. That meant there
would be a high voter turnout. Almost without exception, the state
candidates “endorsed the call.” Momentum began to build.

II. WHAT WERE THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES DURING
THE CALL IN 1968?
Why would people vote for a call? Why would they want the
expense of a convention? During the campaign for the call,
probably six issues dominated the discussion:
1. To modernize, shorten, and liberalize the Illinois
Constitution;
2. To grant home rule powers to the City of Chicago and
maybe other cities and even counties;
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3. To validate the system of classifying real property by its
use for the purpose of ad valorem real property taxation
in Cook County;
4. To replace the popular election of most judges with a
system of having the Governor appoint judges from
nominees chosen by judicial nominating commissions, a
system known as “merit selection”;
5. To abolish the ad valorem personal property tax; and
6. To change the unique system of electing the Illinois
House of Representatives, which was based upon three
representatives elected by cumulative voting, with a
single member districts system.
Let’s see how these six issues fared during the convention
and have fared since adoption of the 1970 Illinois Constitution.
First: modernize, shorten, and liberalize the Illinois
Constitution. The committee offered one overriding reason for
replacing the 1870 Illinois Constitution: Illinois had a horse-andbuggy constitution.
The theme was appealing: we must have a modern
constitution for Illinois. But what did a “modern constitution”
mean? The response was that the constitution, at 21,580 words,
was too long and dealt with outdated issues, such as the regulation
of warehouses (Article XIII) and railroads (Article XI, Sections 915) and the authorization of bonds to finance the World’s
Columbian Exposition of 1893 (Article IX, Section 13).
What happened at the convention? The answer is easy: even
those critical of parts of the 1970 Illinois Constitution agree that it
is shorter, that its language is more modern, and that the
unnecessary “legislative detail” of the 1870 Constitution no longer
clutters the text. Nobody can say that Illinois now has a “horse
and buggy constitution.”
According to data collected by the Book of the States, the
1870 Illinois Constitution contained approximately 21,580 words
when the convention met in 1969. 1 The document that went into
* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. B.A., Grinnell
College; J.D., The University of Chicago. Research Assistant, The Sixth
Illinois Constitutional Convention in 1970; Staff Assistant to The Speaker of
the Illinois House of Representatives, 1971-1975 and Parliamentarian of the
House (1973-1975). Readers who wish to learn more about the parts of the
Illinois Constitution discussed herein should consult Lousin, The Illinois State
Constitution: A Reference Guide (2011).
1. The Council of State Governments, The Book of the States, 19 (1970),
available at http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/bos-2007-chapter-1state-constitutions.
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effect on July 1, 1971, contained approximately 17,500 words,
approximately 80% as many words as before. As of 2013, the
Illinois Constitution, as amended, contained 16,401 words. 2 With
the two amendments adopted November 4, 2014, the constitution
is now slightly longer.
The theme of “modernize, shorten, and liberalize” sold well.
The difficulties arose when anyone asked what specifically the
committee wanted to change. The committee itself did not take a
position. However, some of the proponents almost certainly had
some changes in mind, although they thought it prudent not to
broadcast these views during the 1968 campaign. For example, one
of the chief proponents was the legendary mayor of Chicago,
Richard J. Daley. He wanted the new constitution to make two
significant changes:
1.
2.

Grant constitutional home rule powers to the City of
Chicago, and maybe also to Cook County and some other
cities and counties, but above all, to Chicago; and
Validate the system of classifying real property by its use
for ad valorem real property taxation in Cook County, a
long-established system that was vulnerable to criticism
and that Daley feared would be challenged in federal
courts based on a denial of equal protection theory.

Home rule for Chicago was probably the most important for
Mayor Daley. Although there was some debate over the extent of
home rule powers, there was little opposition to granting
significant home rule powers to the City of Chicago. Without that
grant, the Mayor almost certainly would not have used his vital
political influence to turn out a “yes” vote for the proposed new
constitution.
The home rule provisions of Article VII, Section 6 are often
called the strongest home rule provisions in the country. The
Committee on Local Government knew that there had to be a
reversal of “Dillon’s Rule,” the concept that no local government
could exercise any power unless it had express or virtually express
authorization from either the state constitution or the legislature.
It was easy to say that Chicago should have home rule. Chicago,
founded in 1833, had grown from little more than a trading post at
the mouth of the Chicago River to the second-largest city in the
country and was home to one-third of the population of Illinois.
But how strong should those powers be? Should other cities and
even counties have home rule? In short, how could the state

2. The Council of State Governments, The Book of the States, 12 (2013),
available at http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/book-states-2013-chap
ter-1-state-constitutions.
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constitution accommodate the special needs of Chicago within the
framework of Illinois?
Article VII, Section 6 grants home rule powers to all cities
with a population over 25,000 and any others that opt in by
referendum. According to the Illinois Municipal League,
approximately 200 cities now have home rule status.3 Only a few
cities have opted out of automatic home rule status, of which the
largest is Rockford, then the second-largest city in the state. (It is
now the third-largest city, having been overtaken by Aurora, a
home rule unit.)4
Counties that elect a chief executive officer on a county-wide
basis also automatically obtained home rule status. In practice—
and this was hardly an accident—only Cook County obtained
home rule powers on July 1, 1971. Every attempt by other counties
to obtain home rule status by referendum has failed, even in
DuPage County, which elects a chief executive officer county-wide,
but has rejected home rule status. Cook County is by far the most
populous county. According to the 2010 census, Cook County is
home to 40% of the state’s residents: 5,194,675 out of a total
population of 12,830, 632.5 DuPage County, which contains most of
the western suburbs of Chicago, has 916,924 residents. 6
How important has home rule been to Chicago, Cook
County, and other home rule cities? In this symposium, Joseph
Kearney, a long-time observer of Illinois local government,
analyzes the effects of home rule upon Chicago.7 He concludes that
Chicago absolutely needed home rule to avoid urban stagnation
and compares its situation with that of Detroit, Michigan. Spoiler
alert: Mr. Kearney shows that many of Detroit’s recent problems
stem from the divesting of its home rule powers, which were
granted in 1913 by a constitutional amendment, in 1978. In effect,
Detroit lost much of its power to raise revenue in 1978, just as
Chicago was beginning to use the expansion of its home rule
powers to remain a great metropolis. Mr. Kearney argues that the
courts should allow Chicago to have strong home rule powers in
the twenty-first century.8
3. See Illinois Municipal League, Home Rule Municipalities, IML.ORG,
http://www.iml.org/page.cfm?key=2 (last visited Jan. 3, 2015) (providing a list
of the cities that have been granted home rule status).
4. Hal Dardick, Aurora Now 2nd-largest City in Illinois, CHI. TRIB.,
(July 11, 2003), available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2003-07-11/
news/0307110042_1_census-bureau-population-estimates-second-largest-cityspecial-census.
5. State of Ill., Ill. Census 2010, http://www.illinois.gov/census/Pages/
Census2010Data.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2015).
6. Id.
7. Joseph A. Kearney, Stubhub’s Tug at the Municipal Purse String:
Why the Home Rule Taxing Powers Enumerated in the Illinois Constitution
Must Remain Broad and Strong, 48 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 36 (2014).
8. Id.
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The third issue that arose during the 1968 campaign for a
call was also close to Mayor Daley’s heart: the validation of the
system of classifying real property by its use for ad valorem real
property taxation.
Although many political and economic theorists have argued
that it is improper to establish classes of real property based upon
use, Cook County has long done so. Mayor Daley saw that system
as a key to the power of Cook County (Chicago and its near
suburbs) to control its chief source of local revenue. The
Committee on Revenue and Finance agreed with him, and in the
end so did the other delegates.
Article IX, Section 4(b) allows any county with a population
of more than 200,000 to classify real property for taxation. So far,
only Cook County has chosen to do so, at least officially. I think we
can safely say that most Illinoisans are content with allowing Cook
County to classify real property by use and for other large counties
to have that power, which they decline to exercise.
The fourth issue that arose in 1968 was that of selection of
judges, that is, to replace the popular election of most judges with
a system of having the Governor appoint judges from nominees
chosen by judicial nominating commissions.
Most of those advocating “merit selection” spoke on behalf of
the bar associations and some “citizens’ reform groups.” These
proponents knew that the General Assembly would not submit a
constitutional amendment that would eliminate the popular
election of judges and that a convention was their only opportunity
to effectuate such a change. Most of the merit selection advocates
lived in the Chicago area. In 1968, they were relatively quiet about
their goal because they knew that the vast majority of
Downstaters, both lawyers and voters, favored popular election of
all, or almost all, judges.
The cry of “take the judges out of politics” was heard during
the delegates’ campaigns in 1969. Throughout the country, both in
1970 and now, the issue of popular election of judges has been
contentious.
The issue has been especially contentious in Illinois. Since
the 1848 Illinois Constitution made judgeships elective offices,
Downstaters have preferred that system. Both lawyers and nonlawyers outside of the Chicago area have long believed that judges,
at least local judges, should be elected by the people whom they
will judge. Their position, which even Thomas Jefferson favored
for local state judges, was that most voters really did know the
candidates for judicial office and that, even if they did not, their
local bar associations did. Members of Downstate bar associations
reported that they actively recruited good lawyers for the bench
and helped them get elected.
Residents of Chicago and a few other areas with large ethnic
and minority populations distrusted any appointive system. As
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each ethnic group rose economically and socially in Chicago, some
of its members became lawyers. Admission to the bar was a path
to middle class status and political power. After the Great
Migration of African-Americans from the South, Chicago’s Black
residents saw themselves in the same light.
Advocates of an appointive system found a voice in the
major bar associations. The Chicago Bar Association and the new
Chicago Council of Lawyers, founded in 1969, strongly favored
“merit selection.” It is not clear whether the Illinois State Bar
Association, which had many Downstate members, favored any
appointive system. Merit selection advocates maintained that
“popular election” was a farce, that the political bosses controlled
the process. What was worse, they claimed, was that many judges
elected were not independent of their political organizations.
The convention almost broke apart on this issue. Thirty
years later, I heard from a strong merit selection advocate in the
convention that Mayor Daley offered a compromise very quietly
when it was clear that the two sides were not negotiating. He said
that he would let the seven Supreme Court justices be appointed
by the Governor from among nominees chosen by judicial
nominating commissions. These high-profile judges were, he
reportedly said, not really part of the patronage ladder and were
not known to most voters. The appellate court justices were
negotiable. The circuit court would continue to be divided between
elected circuit court judges and the new Associate Judges. As told
to me, the Mayor pointed out that many Downstaters, as well as
members of racial and ethnic minorities, coveted judgeships for the
lawyers in their communities and did not trust any Governor to
understand “their people.” The person reporting to me said that
the merit selection advocates rejected the Mayor’s offer.
Towards the end of the convention, it was clear that there
would be no compromise. The delegates, in a series of the most
fractious votes at the convention, decided to let the voters decide
between electing and appointing most judges. The delegates
submitted Proposition 2A, which was a modernized, somewhat
“cleaned-up” version of electing most judges, and Proposition 2B,
which called for the Governor to appoint a judge from among three
nominees submitted to him by Judicial Nominating Commissions.
The latter system was called “the Missouri Plan” because Missouri
was the first state to adopt it in 1940. (Ironically, Missouri
apparently took the plan from the 1920 Constitution created by
the Fifth Illinois Constitutional Convention that the voters of
Illinois rejected soundly.)
During the campaign for the constitution between
September 3, 1970, when the convention adjourned, and December
15, 1970, when the referendum on ratification and the four
separate issues took place, the battle between the competing
systems for selecting judges became a focal point. Mayor Daley
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saw the appointive/merit selection system as a serious threat to
his power base. As a Chicago delegate who favored merit selection
put it to me, “circuit court judgeships are the top of the patronage
ladder.” Many Downstaters sided with the Mayor and distrusted
Governors in general, partly because they saw Governors as too
beholden to their power base, which by 1970 was the Chicago
metropolitan area. Most African-Americans in Chicago saw merit
selection as a way that the “Lakefront liberals” and “LaSalle
Street firms” could prevent African-Americans’ ascension to the
bench. Many of the old ethnic groups shared that view. As I recall
that campaign, in which I advocated Proposition 2B, the Hispanic
and Asian voters expressed no viewpoint.
As expected, the Chicago Lakefront voters, the suburban
voters, and some Downstate urban voters supported Proposition
2B. Chicago’s African-American and old ethnic voters supported
Proposition 2A. So did rural Illinoisans. In the end, Proposition 2A
prevailed, and forty-five years later, Illinois still elects all state
judges except the Associate Judges.
The battle continues. Every session of the General Assembly
seems to feature a re-play of the battle over judicial selection.
However, since the impeachment, conviction, and removal of
Governor Rod Blagojevich in 2009, there has been less enthusiasm
for giving a Governor so much power over the judiciary. Shortly
after Blagojevich went to prison, I said to a bar association officer,
“don’t you think that Blago[jevich] would have tried to sell
judgeships as willingly as he apparently tried to sell a Senate
seat?” He replied, “yes, and the line of lawyers willing to pay him
for a judgeship would have stretched around the corner.”
On the other side, those favoring the popular election of
judges have come to realize that judicial elections have become as
nasty as many elections for the executive and legislative branch.
Some have said to me, in private conversations, that the slatemaking committees have less control over the election of judges
than they did in 1970; as one put it, “now we have true elections.”
Advocates of elections are aware, moreover, that the current
posture of elections, supported by several United States Supreme
Court decisions, has meant that non-party political groups have
more sway in deciding judicial races.
The influence of non-party organizations and of groups not
affiliated with a candidate has become critical. In 2004, some
business-oriented groups promoted the election of the Republican
candidate for the Illinois Supreme Court from the Fifth District,
Lloyd Karmeier, in one of the most expensive judicial races ever
held in the United States.9 He won. When he ran for retention in

9. Billy Corriher & Brent DeBeaumont, Dodging a Billion-Dollar
Verdict, THE CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, Aug. 14, 2013, https://www
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2014, a coalition of plaintiffs’ personal injury lawyers, perhaps the
exactly opposite group, promoted his defeat. He kept his seat with
barely 60% of the votes. In 2010 a coalition of business-oriented
groups mounted a campaign against Thomas Kilbride, the
Democratic justice from the third district, albeit without success.
It is clear that groups of all stripes are determined to influence
judicial elections and retention elections.
How can we assess the convention’s “solution” to the
problem of judicial selection? One Chicago lawyer and bar
association official said in the late 1990s that the delegates should
have “put merit selection inside the package rather than allowing
the voters to choose.” I replied that such a move would almost
certainly have doomed the entire constitution. His response was
that it was immoral not to advocate merit selection and that he
would not have minded if the constitution had failed “in such a
noble purpose.” Other lawyers, mostly Lakefront Liberals, have
said to me that “only political hacks favor electing judges.” I doubt
that these proponents understand the concerns of AfricanAmerican, Hispanic, and Downstate voters. However, as merit
selection advocates point out, scandals in the Cook County
judiciary, most notably “Operation Greylord” in the 1980s, have
called into question the methods of selecting and retaining judges.
In short, the two camps cannot compromise yet. The issue that the
convention could not resolve continues.
The fifth and sixth changes mentioned (if not exactly
trumpeted) during the 1968 campaign were of particular interest
to Illinoisans living outside Cook County. They were
5.
6.

To abolish the ad valorem personal property tax, with
the concomitant replacement of revenues lost by the
abolition; and
To change from the unique system of electing the Illinois
House, based upon three representatives elected by
cumulative voting, to the more familiar single-member
districts, first-past-the-post system.

The fifth issue, the abolition of the ad valorem personal
property tax, was important because the counties, apart from Cook
County, imposed it regularly. Banks, businesses with large
inventories, factories with expensive equipment, farmers with
farm machinery—all paid the tax every year. The county assessor
in each of the 101 Downstate counties assessed the value of each
item of personal property. It was said that when “valuation day”
arrived, banks moved their cash assets out of the bank for a few
days. Many taxpayers disputed the value that assessors placed on
.americanprogress.org/issues/civil-liberties/report/2013/08/14/72199/dodging-abillion-dollar-verdict.
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their personal property, but they also realized that the revenue
raised helped support local services, especially schools.
What galled the Downstate taxpayers was that the Cook
County government had given up on collecting the tax from
individuals in the most populous county in Illinois. Only
businesses paid the tax. Rumors of corruption flourished. By the
mid-1960s it was said that 10% of the property tax revenue raised
in Cook County came from this hated tax, the other 90% being
raised from ad valorem taxation on real property. Because it was
so difficult to establish the value of factory machinery and
business inventory, those business taxpayers often negotiated tax
settlements with the county assessor. It was rumored that the
settlement often involved a contribution to the Cook County
Democratic Party, giving rise to the claim that “the personal
property tax is the fund-raising arm of the Cook County
Democratic Party.” Downstaters argued that if most Cook County
taxpayers did not pay the tax, neither should Downstate
taxpayers.
The convention debated the issue for weeks. In the end, it
decided upon Article IX, Section 5, which abolished this “mosthated tax in Illinois” as of 1979 and mandated that the legislature
replace the revenues lost to local governments and school districts.
The path to abolition was tortured, with many twists and turns in
the Illinois Supreme Court. However, the Court eventually
mandated abolition as of 1979.
The local governments and school districts, at least outside
Chicago, were vocal in their insistence upon an immediate
“replacement tax.” As expected, this tax took the form of a
surcharge upon the corporate tax rate. It is safe to say that the
convention’s solution, while messy, was the only one that was
politically and economically feasible. It is also safe to say that few
Illinoisans even remember this tax, let alone know why it was so
controversial.
The sixth major issue, to change the method of electing the
Illinois House of Representatives, involved a system unique to
Illinois. During the Fourth Illinois Constitutional Convention in
1869-1870, the publisher of the Chicago Tribune, Delegate Joseph
Medill, proposed a way to heal the north-south division in Illinois.
During the Civil War, many Southern Illinoisans opposed Lincoln,
the Union, abolition of slavery, and the war. They were
Democrats. Many who lived in the northern third of the state felt
exactly the opposite on those issues. They were Republicans.
Medill thought that no Republican could be elected in the southern
third of the state and no Democrat could be elected in the northern
third.
To insure that members of minority parties in each part of
the state could have a voice in the General Assembly, Medill
suggested that there be three representatives elected at large from
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each district. The key feature of his proposal, perhaps unique to
Illinois, was “cumulative voting.” Each voter could cast up to three
votes in the House election. Many “minority” voters cast a “bullet
vote,” that is to say, three votes for their favorite candidate. As a
result, each of the two major parties was virtually guaranteed onethird of the seats in the House. Because some of the “minority
representatives” were elected with a very small percentage of the
total vote, that party had greater power than it would have had in
a “single member district” or “first past the post” type of election.
That was especially apparent if the strength of the minority party
was spread across a fairly wide geographical area.
By the 1960s, the geographical bases of the two parties had
changed places. Most of the voters in the Chicago suburbs and the
more-sparsely-populated areas of the rest of the state, voted
Republican more often than they voted Democratic in state and
local elections. Most Chicagoans voted Democratic in state and
local elections. Downstate voters should have liked having one
Republican in each of the House districts in Chicago. However,
most of the “Chicago Republicans” were “Chicagoans” rather than
“Republicans.” Except for voting for the Republican candidate for
Speaker, they voted with Democrats from Chicago, or at least with
the progressive wing of that faction, more frequently than they
voted with suburban and Downstate Republicans.
The Downstate Democrats in the House also frequently
voted with the two Republicans with whom they represented their
districts. However, the Downstate Democrats were not immune
from pressure exerted by the most powerful Democrat in the state,
Mayor Daley of Chicago. On issues important to the Democrats of
Chicago, the Mayor could often count on support from the entire
Chicago delegation and most of the Downstate Democrats, thereby
outflanking the House Republicans.
For all these reasons, some Downstate delegates wanted to
abolish the cumulative voting system in favor of a single member
district system. They were sometimes remarkably vociferous about
it, and passions on both sides ran high. Consequently, the issue of
how to elect state representatives also almost broke up the
convention. I well remember delegate David Davis10 from Central
Illinois declaring,
I am not threatening to go out and fight against the
adoption of the product of this Convention, but I am
saying to you that at this point, and after spending two
weeks trying to find things that I did think were good for

10. Delegate Davis was from a powerful Republican family in
Bloomington. His great-grandfather was Abraham Lincoln’s campaign
manager in 1860 and later an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States.
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my area, this was one of the few things that I found that
was of importance; and when you take this away, you
take away from me a great deal of the incentive I might
have had to go out and work for the adoption of a new
constitution in this state.11
In effect, he was hinting that he would not mind if the 1870
Constitution continued. He threatened to oppose any proposed
constitution that favored keeping the Medill system.
To avoid a crisis as intractable as the issue of how to select
judges, the delegates took a two-pronged approach to the problem.
First, they submitted the issue to the voters to be voted upon
separately from the main body of the constitution, as they did with
the selection of judges. This “election of the House” proposal was
the first “separately submitted issue” that voters saw on the ballot
on December 15, 1970. Proposition 1A called for retention of the
Medill system in a slightly modified form that made it more
difficult for the two parties to insure the election of three
candidates: by holding that if a party limited the number of
candidates who could run, it could not limit to fewer than two
candidates. This virtually guaranteed that there would be four
people running for three seats. Proposition 1B called for a single
member districts system.
Mayor Daley and many political party leaders desirous of
keeping a foothold in every district in the state supported
Proposition 1A. The League of Women Voters, many suburbanites,
and most political theorists supported Proposition 1B. The voters
decided to retain the Medill system.
Second, the delegates established a limited popular
initiative for amending the Legislative Article, Article IV. It was
clear that incumbent House members would never vote for any
change in the method of their election or the size of the House. The
limited “citizens’ initiative,” contained in Article XIV, Section 3,
has been very controversial. Despite several attempts to get
“citizens’ initiative” amendments on the ballot, only one proposal
has met constitutional muster in the courts: the so-called “Cutback
Amendment” of 1980. This amendment reduced the size of the
House by one-third, which was very popular with the voters and
was the source of its name, “the Cutback Amendment.” It also—
and much more importantly—replaced the Medill system with the
single member districts system.
When presented with the 1980 amendment, most voters saw
it as a way to reduce the size of the House. They saw it as a way to
strike back at legislators, who had just voted themselves a pay
raise, by “throwing out” at least one-third of the incumbents in
11. V Record of Proceedings, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 3665, 4321 (Aug. 28, 1970).
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1982. Indeed, Pat Quinn, the political activist who spearheaded
the drive for signatures on the petitions to put the amendment on
the ballot, advertised it that way. The League of Women Voters of
Illinois, which had long supported eliminating the Medill system
for reasons never entirely clear to me, saw this as a way to obtain
a single member districts system. Probably few voters understood
the true implications of eliminating the Medill system. They
adopted the Cutback Amendment.
This issue, therefore, seems to have been resolved
successfully. The convention offered the voters a choice in 1970
and a means to choose the single member districts system later on.
Whether the people of Illinois are satisfied with the choice they
made in 1980 is problematical. (Frankly, I would much prefer a
return to multi-member districts with cumulative voting.)

III. WHAT WERE THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES
THAT EMERGED DURING THE DELEGATES’
CAMPAIGNS IN 1969?
By the time of the referendum on “the con con call” in
November 1968, the six issues just discussed were clearly on the
table. After the call passed, some other issues emerged during the
election of the members of the convention, usually called
“delegates,” in the summer and fall of 1969. There were probably
as many as ten issues that became fodder for the campaigns.
Whether those casting ballots voted for the candidates based on
their positions is problematical. However, many candidates later
mentioned that these issues occasionally surfaced during their
campaigns.
First of all, the issue of liberalizing the constitutional
amending process came to the fore. All of the candidates and many
voters were aware of the strictures on amending that had kept the
1870 Constitution in a straitjacket. A two-thirds vote in both
houses was difficult to obtain in order to propose a constitutional
amendment. A vote of a majority of those voting on the question
was also difficult to obtain because there appeared to be a built-in
“no” vote of about 30% on any amendment. But what should the
amending process entail? The American constitutional tradition
favors making constitutional amendments difficult. Constitutions,
after all, are not statutes. They are basic charters, not to be
tampered with lightly. Opinions differed on how to “loosen up” the
amending process.
However, as I recall, there was little or no real enthusiasm
for a popular initiative for constitutional amendments. That
proposal, which eventually became Article XIV, Section 3 of the
1970 Illinois Constitution, saw the light of day only as part of a
compromise on the dispute over electing the Illinois House.
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The delegates liberalized the amending process in three
ways:
1. By lowering the votes needed to propose amendments to
the constitution;
2. By requiring that the issue of whether a constitutional
convention should be called be placed on the ballot every
twenty years automatically, without any action by the
legislative branch; and
3. By allowing a limited citizens’ initiative to the
“structural and procedural” parts of the Legislative
article.
It now takes three-fifths of those elected to each house to
propose an amendment, although it also takes three-fifths of those
voting on the amendment (or “a majority of those voting at the
election,” which is meaningless) to approve an amendment. It is
not easy to obtain an extraordinary majority in the General
Assembly, but if the leaders of both parties in both houses agree
upon the measure, it will pass. Approval by the voters is more
problematical, but as of November 2014, thirteen of the twentyone amendments submitted to the voters have been adopted.
The automatic call provision has met two tests: in 1988 and
in 2008. Both times the voters declined to call another “con con.”
The campaign to obtain approval for a convention requires a
unified message across all parts of the state and its political life,
as was true in 1968. In 1988 it was difficult to convince voters that
there should be another convention so soon after the Sixth Illinois
Constitutional Convention, especially because the principal aim of
proponents was to change to a “merit selection” system of selecting
judges. Among Downstaters and African-Americans, that
suggestion was anathema. In 2008 the proponents were totally
disorganized, ranging from extreme left liberals (“we want a con
con to have the people’s voices heard,” “we want a con con to
combat global warming”) to extreme right conservatives (“we want
a con con to prevent school principals from getting such big
pensions,” “we want a con con to lower all taxes”). For example,
those favoring increased school funding, often by increasing the
income tax, were as numerous as those who favored decreasing
taxes for schools. The two factions could not compromise and
certainly could not have worked together at a convention.
The second issue was the prohibition on branch banking.
Article XI, Section 5 of the 1870 Constitution effectively prevented
Illinois banks from having branches. Downstate bankers preferred
it that way. The fear was expressed in the phrase, “if we had
branch banking, Continental Illinois National Bank in Chicago
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would have a branch on every street corner in Peoria and
Springfield.” Nowhere was the social and economic split between
Chicago and the rest of the state more apparent than in the
banking issue. For their part, the large Chicago banks, known as
“the LaSalle Street banks,” believed that Chicago was emerging as
a power on the international economic stage and that Illinois
needed to allow banks to expand to meet the demands of the latter
part of the twentieth, as well as the twenty-first, centuries.
Candidates running far from Chicago reported that their voters
were concerned about “having their banks taken over by Chicago.”
After months of lobbying by banks on both sides, the
delegates adopted Article XIII, Section 8, which effectively makes
the issue of branch banking one for the General Assembly to
decide. Economic forces pushed the legislature into adopting first
ATM’s and then full branches. Young Illinoisans, who frequently
“bank” by pressing an app on their iPhones, have no clue about the
controversy in 1969-1970. Ironically, Continental Illinois National
Bank, the bugaboo of Downstate banks, is no more; Bank of
America took it over in 1994.12
The third issue, which emerged very quietly, was the
protection of benefits earned by public employees. Several
candidates received letters from public employees, especially
school teachers and university personnel, who were concerned that
their pensions “would not be there” when they retired. By the time
the convention began holding hearings, the Downstate fire fighters
and police officers had joined the educators in expressing fears
that their pension funds were seriously underfunded. This
complicated issue, which has emerged as one of the major issues of
the twenty-first century in state and local government, began to
emerge in letters to con con candidates. However, I do not
remember any organized movement to persuade candidates to
promise to guarantee full funding of pensions or any newspaper
editorials advocating that the candidates tackle the funding issue.
The delegates adopted a measure introduced on the floor in
July 1970. Based on a provision in the New York Constitution,
Article XIII, Section 5 made public employees’ pension and
retirement rights contracts that could not be “diminished or
impaired.” As the state’s fiscal situation worsened in 2008, this
provision became controversial. Legislation and litigation have
attempted to clarify the provision and ameliorate the burden of
meeting the pension obligations. This symposium features Eric M.
Madiar’s seminal article, without question the most

12. Sharon Stangenes, Continental Bank No More, CHI. TRIB., (Aug. 31,
1994), available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1994-08-31/business/9408
310113_1_merchants-savings-grand-banking-ha\ll-lasalle-street.

16

The John Marshall Law Review

[48:1

comprehensive discussion of the history, issues, legislation, and
litigation on the topic.13
The fourth issue was “the 18-year-old vote.” Illinois, like
most states, gave only those who had reached their twenty-first
birthday the constitutional right to vote. The legislature could
have extended the franchise by statute, but had chosen not to do
so. Some youth groups organized campaigns to “give youth the
vote.” The ongoing war in Vietnam complicated the discussion
because it seemed incongruous that men who could not vote on
whether there was a war should be asked to risk their lives in that
far-away conflict.
The delegates were as split on the issue as the legislators
were. In the end, they submitted it to the voters as a separate
issue at the referendum on adopting the constitution on December
15, 1970. The voters decided to keep the voting age at 21. Exactly
one week later, the Supreme Court of the United States handed
down Oregon v. Mitchell,14 which held a Congressional statute
lowering the voting age valid as to federal elections. Faced with
“split elections” every two years, Congress submitted the TwentySixth Amendment to the state legislatures in 1971. When it
received approval from three-fourths of the state legislatures,
including Illinois, the issue was settled in favor of the lower voting
age.
The fifth issue involved ethical conduct by judges. As
mentioned before, there were Illinoisans who wished “to take
judges out of politics” by having them appointed, usually by the
Governor, not elected by the voters. Apart from that issue, it was
clear that some judges were ethically challenged. In 1968, a
solitary “legal researcher” named Sherman Skolnick uncovered
evidence that at least two members of the Illinois Supreme Court
were too close to party organizations and may have been taking
bribes. The resulting scandal, called the Solfisburg-Klingbiel
scandal after the two justices, revealed that these ethical lapses
were simply the tip of the iceberg. It is impossible to overestimate
the effect of the scandal, which occupied the newspapers virtually
every day, upon the campaigns and later upon the convention’s
deliberations.
The convention’s Committee on the Judiciary wrestled with
the issue for months. Eventually it proposed, and the convention
adopted, a two-step process in judicial discipline, in Article VI,
Section 15. The first step, which was new, was the establishment
of a fact-finding commission, the Judicial Inquiry Board, to hear
complaints against judges. Most of the members of the Board were

13. Eric Madiar, Is Welching on Public Pension Promises an Option for
Illinois? An Analysis of Article XIII, Section 5 of the Illinois Constitution 48 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 166 (2014).
14. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
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non-judges and appointed by the Governor. The second step was
retained from the 1962 Judicial Article to the 1870 Constitution, a
Courts Commission composed of judges, which decided whether
complaints brought by the Board warranted disciplinary action. In
1998, the voters approved an amendment to place two non-judges
on the Commission.
Opinion on the efficacy of the new system is divided. (As an
alternate citizen member of the Commission, I sat on one case in
2002, and thought it proceeded well.) However, there have been no
scandals. Most critics think that the Board and perhaps the
Commission have not been aggressive enough in disciplining and
removing “bad judges.” On the other hand, the occasional
“voluntary resignation” of a judge under investigation suggests
that perhaps the system works better than it appears to, but just
quietly.
The sixth issue was that of shortening the statewide ballot
for elections. Illinois elected the Clerk of the Supreme Court and
the Superintendent of Public Instruction, as well as the usual
executive officers. Obviously, few people besides the seven
members of the Supreme Court cared who the Clerk was.
However, he was typically a Downstater who employed many
Springfield residents and who reportedly sometimes operated
somewhat independently of the Court. There was little opposition
to eliminating that office as elective.
The Superintendent of Public Instruction was often a party
operative—some might say a party hack—who had very little
power, but many patronage employees. During the convention, a
scandal in the office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction
concerning a “flower fund” that the Superintendent collected from
his employees should have made it easy to eliminate that office.
However, the teachers’ unions opposed eliminating election of the
Superintendent. It is not clear why. Apparently, they thought that
they were gaining enough political power that they could influence
the election of that state officer, who in fact had comparatively
little authority over state financing and supervision of the
curriculum—those were the province of the General Assembly.
A bigger problem was whether to eliminate the election of
two fiscal officers, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of
State. The two fiscal officers were the Treasurer and the Auditor of
Public Accounts under the 1870 Constitution. The convention
updated the latter to be the Comptroller. An effort to combine the
two fiscal officers failed largely because both political parties
found it enough to eliminate the two most minor offices just
mentioned. Likewise, there was no real desire to eliminate the
election of the Attorney General and the Secretary of State.
Surprisingly, there was little desire to eliminate the officer called
the Lieutenant-Governor, perhaps because he (but more recently
she) has been useful in “balancing the ticket.”
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Most states have at least one statewide elected fiscal officer,
an elected Secretary of State, an elected Attorney General, and
even an elected Lieutenant-Governor, although the last-named is
really only a deputy to the Governor. One reason it is so hard to
eliminate their election is that people fear that an officer
appointed by the Governor would not be truly independent of “the
boss.” Presidents of the United States fire the comparable officers
as they wish. Another reason is related to the “stepping stone”
theory of political advancement: an ambitious person starts out
with election to the less powerful offices and then proceeds to the
position of Attorney General or Secretary of State and then the
post of Governor, the most powerful in the state.
The seventh issue was education—financing, supervision,
etc. The “Blaine Amendment,” which supposedly prohibited aid to
religious schools, could have been controversial. The issue arose in
some candidates’ forums, especially in the Chicago metropolitan
area. When the Chicago Catholic Archdiocese, at the urging of one
of the members of the Committee on Education, decided not to
press that issue, it was clear that the amendment, Article X,
Section 3, would remain as was, comma for comma. In fact, most
candidates realized that “aid to parochial (read: Catholic) schools”
was a federal constitutional matter.
However, by 1969 the issue of financing public schools began
to come to the fore. Illinois, like most states, allowed local districts
to control the revenue for schools. The increasing number of
legislative directives on curriculum and school policies meant that
the state played an ever-increasing role, but most parents wanted
“to keep local control of schools.” Nobody had a perfect answer, but
the 1969 campaigns suggested that a restructuring of financing
seemed inevitable. When Illinois enacted a state income tax in
1969, it became possible, for the first time, to envision increased
state aid to schools.15 Those intertwined issues, financing and
supervision, began to surface during the campaign. However, I
have not heard of any candidate who proposed a concrete plan as
part of his or her platform.
The issues of financing and supervising public elementary
and secondary education were already among the thorniest,
perhaps almost unsolvable, issues of state government. 16 Indeed,
over the last forty-five years, financing and supervising public
education has become one of the paramount issues of public policy
in the entire country.
The convention’s Committee on Education debated this issue
and split over a proposal to prohibit school districts from spending
more than 10% above their state subsidy in operating costs. The

15. FRANK KOPECKY & MARY SHERMAN HARRIS, UNDERSTANDING THE
ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION 10 (2d ed. 2000).
16. Id. at 51.
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purpose of this proposal was to “nudge” all school districts to lobby
the legislature for a larger state subsidy. In short, it was an
attempt to obtain more statewide funding for all school districts.
The convention did not approve. Instead, it agreed upon a
compromise: the hortatory language in Article X, Section 1, which
reads,
The State has the primary responsibility for financing the system of
public education.17

The cases interpreting this provision have made it clear that
the courts do not wish to substitute the legislature’s judgment
about financing with their own.18 Illinois continues to rely heavily
upon the ad valorem real property tax as the basis of funding.
School districts in high per capita income areas usually impose
high property taxes. They also regularly seek bonding referendum
approval for capital expenditures, including new school buildings,
sports facilities, and even deeper diving wells in high school
swimming pools
Because Matthew Locke has contributed a discussion of
education financing to this symposium, there is no need to
elaborate upon the issues here. Suffice it to say, the problem raises
profound and vexing questions about the role of money in
education and of state versus local control over schools. The issue
is critical because, as Mr. Locke notes, education is “the silver
bullet” to success in American society. 19
The eighth issue was the method of redistricting the
legislature. The United States Supreme Court cases of the early
1960s made it clear that all fifty states had to devise a means of
redistricting every decade. Case law was sparse, indeed almost
non-existent. Legislators and party officials were hostile to almost
any change. One thing was clear: the 1964 at-large election for the
Illinois House, the “bedsheet ballot,” had been a logistical
nightmare.20 Because the legislature could not redistrict itself in
1963, there was a paper ballot of considerable size in the
November 1964 election.21 Each of the two major parties ran a
“slate” of candidates for the House. Most voters simply voted a
party slate. Democrats won two-thirds of the seats, leaving
Republicans with only one-third.
17. IL CONST. art. X, § 1 (emphasis added).
18. Board of Ed., School Dist. No. 150, Peoria v. Cronin, 51 Ill. App. 3d
838, 842-43 (3d Dist. 1977) (citing McLain et al. v. Phelps et al., 409 Ill. 393
(1951)); People v. Deartherage, 401 Ill. 25 (1948).
19. Matthew A. Locke, Illinois Gets an “F” in Public School Financing,
48 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 141 (2014).
20. Rick Pearson & Thomas Hardy, Ruling Rekindles Visions of ’64
‘bedsheet’ Ballot, CHI. TRIB., (Dec. 17, 1991), available at http://articles.chicagotri
bune.com/1991-12-17/news/9104230254_1_illinois-supreme-court-democrats-andrepublicans-straight-ticket.
21. Id.
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By 1966, Illinois returned to a more normal election
procedure, but the specter of the 1964 “bedsheet ballot” hung like
a pall over the convention. None of the delegates wanted that to
happen again. But what was the solution? As I recall, no candidate
had any specific proposal.
Like education financing, this is an issue that admits of no
easy solution. It is common to deride the complicated three-step
procedure for redistricting set forth in Article IV, Section 3.
Indeed, this provision is one of the most frequently criticized
provisions in the 1970 Illinois Constitution.
We must remember that the provision was drafted in 1970;
only eight years after the federal courts entered “the political
thicket” of redistricting in Baker v. Carr.22 The Illinois cases on
legislative redistricting were few and essentially inconclusive. The
delegates had little guidance from the courts and from other states
on how to redistrict every ten years. Computers were in their
infancy. When I ask critics of the current Illinois system to
imagine devising a redistricting system using only the cases
decided by 1970, they are at a loss. It is easy to look back and
criticize—hindsight is always 20-20—but the system created in
1970 has had one great success: it has obviated a statewide ballot
imposed upon the election of legislators.
Clearly, nobody foresaw computerized redistricting, modern
campaign financing, and the development of a voluminous body of
federal case law on constitutional and statutory provisions.
All efforts to revise the process in Illinois have failed.
Reformers say that is due to the intransigence of the legislature,
but I think it is really due to the inability to devise a really good
alternative to the present system. The adoption of the single
member districts system for electing the Illinois House has
exacerbated the problem. Every ten years, Illinois carves fifty-nine
Senate districts and then divides each of those districts into two
districts for the members of the House. Every division entails
another battle over where to draw lines.
In short, the issue of legislative redistricting is a continuing
and unresolved problem.
The ninth issue was that of general ethics. Many candidates
campaigned on the vague promise of promoting “honest
government.” Again, candidates were short on concrete proposals.
There was a general agreement that “we must eliminate
corruption,” “we should set standards for public officials,” and “we
must clean up government”. In the end, the delegates adopted an
updated and expanded version of some sections in the 1870
Constitution. These provisions, in Article XIII, Sections 1, 2, and 3,
require officials to disclose their income while running for office
and while in office, and seek to keep convicted felons out of office.
22. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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However, at least one delegate had a specific proposal. Mary
Lee Leahy of Chicago’s South Shore neighborhood promised to try
to eliminate the patronage system then prevalent in Illinois,
especially in Chicago. Of course, she failed at the convention.
However, as she reminded me years later, it was an unsuccessful
candidate for a seat in the convention, Michael I. Shakman, who
struck the greatest blow against “the patronage machine.”
Shakman claimed he lost in Chicago’s Hyde Park area because the
Regular Democratic Organization of Cook County had used public
employees as “foot soldiers” for his opponents. The litigation went
on for over forty years. Is it not ironic that a candidate for a nonpartisan position in a temporary office was the driving force
behind the largely successful war on political patronage?
Is it also not fitting that Mrs. Leahy later argued one of the
most important patronage cases, Rutan v. Republican Party of
Illinois,23 before the Supreme Court of the United States, a case
that severely curtailed patronage on the state level against the
Republican Party? Ironically, as Mrs. Leahy and I discussed years
later, if Mayor Daley had not thrown his support behind the
constitution, including sending forth all of his precinct captains to
produce a vote for the constitution on December 15, 1970, there
would probably not have been a 1970 Constitution. A huge part of
the 55% affirmative vote for ratification came from Chicago. Could
any Governor or any Mayor “gin up” such a vote in the postShakman Decrees era?
The tenth and final issue that emerged during the
campaigns was virtually confined to parts of Illinois outside the
Chicago metropolitan area. It was gun control and “the right to
bear arms.” At that time, most observers thought that the Second
Amendment to the United States Constitution did not apply to the
states. Illinois had no “right to arms” in its constitution. Many
candidates running in Downstate rural areas, where hunting and
self-protection are almost sacred, wanted their right to keep and
bear arms recognized in the state constitution. In 1969, Illinois
enacted a firearm owners registration statute. Downstate
constituents, particularly those in rural areas, were upset. Few
urban dwellers, particularly Chicagoans, understood their anger.
Yet those Downstaters were adamant. They saw the registration
statute as the nose of the camel entering the tent and desired a
constitutional provision to stop the camel from going farther.
In the end, the convention adopted Article I, Section 22,
which provides a right to bear arms completely separate from that
in the Second Amendment.24 Recent cases in the Supreme Court of
the United States have expanded the federal right to the state,

23. 497 U.S. 62 (1970).
24. IL CONST. art. I, § 22.
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including Illinois.25 It is safe to say that, at least until now, the
federal and state courts have decided Illinois gun law issues on the
federal right, with little reference to the Illinois state right. James
Leven’s article in this symposium issue discusses the interplay
between those two rights as an example of the lockstep doctrine in
assessing federal and state rights on the same subject.
By December 8, 1969, when Governor Richard B. Ogilvie
called the convention to order in Springfield, it was clear that
perhaps as many as twenty issues were “on the table.” The
delegates would have to address them. When the President of the
convention, Samuel W. Witwer, appointed the committees, each
committee knew which of these issues it would have to address.
Each committee was tasked with holding hearings on the
respective issues, debating member proposals, and recommending
or not recommending a course of action to their fellow delegates.
Opinions as to how important the issues were at the time will
surely differ, but I think most observers would agree that each of
the topics discussed above has played a significant role in Illinois
in the last forty-five years.

IV. WHICH ISSUES AROSE DURING THE CONVENTION, HOW
DID THE CONVENTION ADDRESS THEM, AND WHAT HAS
HAPPENED IN THE LAST FORTY-FIVE YEARS?
As the convention met, other issues arose. It is difficult to
decide which were the most important. However, there were at
least a dozen that emerged from the committee hearings and
deliberations or from the floor debates.
The Committee on the Bill of Rights soon heard from those
advocating state civil rights provisions to protect against
discrimination based on race, religion, or nationality, as well as on
sex and physical or mental handicap. They also heard from those
wanting strong state protections of the rights of those accused of
crimes and from those wanting a specific right to privacy. A
coalition of citizens also sought a constitutional abolition of the
death penalty.
The Committee on Suffrage and Amending heard many
proposals on improving the administration of elections, primarily
by removing much of the power in that area from the Secretary of
State. It also heard proposals that those who have served their
sentences for felonies should have the right to vote restored
automatically without having to petition the Governor for a
pardon first.

25. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); McDonald v.
City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
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The Committee on the Legislature soon found itself dealing
with issues more mundane than electing the State
Representatives and redistricting. It, along with the Committee on
the Executive, had to evaluate the relationship between the
Governor and the General Assembly, especially the types of vetoes
and the votes needed to override the vetoes. It also had to consider
which of the traditional restrictions on legislation, such as the
bans on special legislation and bundling two or more subjects into
one bill, should be in the new constitution. Overarching the rules
regarding legislation was whether the courts could police those
rules via the “journal entry rule,” as it did under the 1870
Constitution, or through the “enrolled bill rule,” which was the
more modern way of enforcing those rules.
The Committee on the Executive also dealt with the
relationship between the Governor and the General Assembly,
especially regarding vetoes, and of course with the issue of which
officers should be elected on a statewide ballot. However, it also
considered the powers of those officers who would remain elected.
The Governor, as the “chief executive officer” of the state, had to
have strong powers, but how many? Which ones? And should the
legislature have any way to constrain the Governor, such as
through impeachment? The powers of the Attorney General were
also debated. Those powers were derived from the common law as
much as from statutes.
The Committee on the Judiciary had a unique task because
the judicial branch had undergone a substantial revision with the
adoption of the 1962 Judicial Amendment, effective in 1964. In
terms of structure, Illinois had as modern a system as any in the
country. However, the issue of electing judges versus appointing
judges and the issue of judicial conduct after the SolfisburgKlingbiel scandal dominated that committee’s deliberations.
Another issue that surfaced during the convention was the status
of the “magistrates,” who were Circuit Court judges chosen by the
elected Circuit Court judges and whose terms depended upon the
desires of those who chose them, i.e., they were at will employees.
Soon there was general agreement that they should have a more
suitable title and some job security.
The Committee on Local Government dealt with the
paramount issue of municipal and county home rule. However, it
also learned that units of local government needed more powers
generally. That raised the issue of special districts, of which
Illinois has the largest number in the country, and townships.
Because so many Downstaters were loath to part with these
“lesser” forms of local government, which exercised highlyrestricted powers, the committee had to walk a tightrope. Would
empowering the “general purpose” governments of counties and
cities overly-diminish the powers of the special districts and
townships? It was also suggested that because Illinois had so
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many local governments, the governments should be allowed to
cooperate extensively.
The Committee on Revenue and Finance decided quickly
that it was necessary to establish a constitutional framework for
the budgeting, appropriations, and fiscal process. This was called
the Finance Article. Only after it completed that article, which it
developed in consultation with the Committees on the Legislature
and the Executive, could it turn to the huge issues of raising
revenue.
I admit that other observers might list yet other issues that
developed after the delegates took office on December 8, 1969, but
I think these were the most important ones that arose during the
course of the convention.
In short, there is a total of twenty to thirty significant
issues—perhaps six truly major ones and between twenty and
twenty-five important ones. There were times when the convention
threatened to break apart over the major issues, which had the
most significant political implications, such as selection of judges
and electing state representatives. However, debates over the
other issues could also be heated.

A. Rights of Those Accused of Crimes
The Bill of Rights Committee modernized several sections
pertaining to the rights of those accused of crimes that were in the
1870 Constitution’s Bill of Rights. There are now six sections in
Article I on the subject: Section 7 Indictment and Preliminary
Hearing; Section 8 Rights after Indictment; Section 8.1 Crime
Victim’s Rights (a section added in 1992 and amended in 2014);
Section 9 Bail and Habeas Corpus; Section 10 Self-incrimination
and Double Jeopardy; and Section 11 Limitation on Penalties after
Conviction.26
To a great extent, the Bill of Rights Committee simply
updated previous rights, and the other delegates agreed to the
changes. In 1992, the voters adopted Section 8.1, a crime victim’s
rights amendment, which they expanded in November 2014. In
both cases, the amendments were part of a nation-wide attempt to
include participation by victims of crimes or their families in the
criminal trial process. At the time of the 1969-1970 convention,
that movement did not exist.
Section 9 concerns both bail and habeas corpus. By its
provisions, bail was available except for “capital offenses.” When
the legislature reduced the number of crimes that were “death
penalty eligible” in the 1970s, one consequence was the adoption of
two amendments, one in 1982 and one in 1986. These stipulated
that crimes for which life imprisonment was a possible penalty
26. IL CONST. art. I, §§ 7, 8, 9, 10, 11.
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were also offenses for which a defendant had no right to bail. Since
Illinois abolished the death penalty in 2011, the maximum penalty
has been life imprisonment without parole.
The revision to Section 11 may have had some impact.
Article II, Section 1 of the 1870 Constitution mandated that
sentences, both in the penal code and as handed down from the
bench, be “apportioned to the nature of the offense.” The
convention added the mandated objective of “restoring the offender
to useful citizenship.” Because this “rehabilitation clause” arose
from a floor amendment, not a committee report, we are not
certain what the convention thought the effect of the added
language would be. The early cases, interpreting the combination
of seriousness of the offense and potential for rehabilitation,
sometimes held invalid either a statutory penalty or a specific
sentence. In recent years, courts have shown more deference to the
legislature’s judgment as to statutory penalties. Because the
statutes limit the range of penalties, judges now have relatively
little discretion in imposing sentences upon specific defendants.

B. Search and Seizure; Right to Privacy
Article I, Section 6 contains the thorniest issue of the
criminal justice provisions in the Bill of Rights. To the previous
constitutional right, the convention added language prohibiting
unreasonable “interceptions of communications by eavesdropping
devices or other means” and unreasonable “invasions of privacy.”
Although the “right to privacy” is separate, it can also be read with
the language on “searches and seizures” and “interceptions of
communications.”
The cases run into the dozens, if not the hundreds, and
many are both controversial and volatile. The advent of more
mechanized forms of communication, such as the computer upon
which I am writing this article, and the development of a “privacy”
jurisprudence in areas such as abortion and “marriage equality,”
have transformed the debate. Timothy O’Neill’s article in this
symposium issue about the Illinois Supreme Court’s creation of
the “lockstep doctrine”27 treats the issue of the relationship
between the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 6 so
comprehensively that I need not address it here. Suffice it to say
that this is an unsettled issue, one that in fact may never be
settled.

C. Civil Rights
Article I, Sections 17, 18, and 19 may have been the first
state constitutional provisions protecting civil rights; certainly no
27. Timothy P. O’Neill, Escape From Freedom: Why “Limited Lockstep”
Betrays Our System of Federalism, 48 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 320 (2014).
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Illinois Constitution had addressed them. In that context, the
three provisions are rather breathtaking. Because Illinois has a
sad history in racial justice, it is noteworthy that the convention
broke from the past here, even adding new rights concerning
gender and disability.
Section 17 is a standard civil rights provision and is to some
extent a state version of the 1964 Civil Rights Act on the federal
level. It arose from the Bill of Rights Committee. The AfricanAmerican delegates were especially eager to have it proposed.
Section 19 was truly an innovation because the “rights of the
handicapped” were not addressed on the federal level until the
passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990. The
convention broke ground with this provision.
Court decisions and statutes implementing Sections 17 and
19 have largely confined them to administrative proceedings on
the state level. Although it is likely that the delegates really
wanted the rights in both Section 17 and Section 19 to be the basis
of original suits in courts, that is not the reality. There seems to be
little dissatisfaction with the administrative procedures.
Section 18 was a “little equal rights amendment,” a
provision introduced on the floor by two women delegates, one
White and one African-American. This was probably the first state
constitutional provision mandating equality on the basis of gender
in the country. It antedated the federal “E.R.A.” by two years.
Because there is a requirement of state action, only governmental
actions are covered. The litigation has established that “sex” or
gender is a suspect classification and that a “strict scrutiny test”
would apply to judge any governmental action differentiating
between the sexes. Although the country as a whole does not have
the E.R.A., Illinois does.

D. The Death Penalty
A coalition of opponents of capital punishment joined with
several delegates who had long opposed the death penalty to
propose abolition by constitutional fiat. Because the delegates
were unable to decide whether the state constitution should
abolish the death penalty, they decided to submit the issue to the
voters as a “separately-submitted” issue at the referendum on the
constitution. The voters decisively refused to abolish capital
punishment in the state constitution. However, in March 2011,
Illinois abolished the death penalty by statute.
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E. The Administration of Elections
The principal change wrought in Illinois elections was the
transfer of administration from the elected officer known as the
Secretary of State to a newly created State Board of Elections. 28
Many of the delegates had experienced the openly partisan and
often arbitrary actions of the then-Secretary of State, Paul Powell.
Powell, an old time Southern Illinois Democrat who believed in the
spoils system, said when he was elected to an office, “I smell the
meat a-cookin.’” 29 There was some indication that he approached
the administration of elections with that attitude.
The convention’s solution was to create a bipartisan or nonpartisan Board within the executive branch.30 The Governor
appoints the members, whose duties are set forth in statutes.31
There is debate over whether the Board is truly effective and truly
fair. However, in the forty-odd years of its operations, it has
remained relatively free of scandal. Moreover, it is the legislature
that determines the powers of the Board, and in a state with a
tradition of strong local control over elections, it is difficult to
impose statewide standards and procedures.
Probably, the most accurate description of the Board is that
it has not lived up to the highest expectations of the delegates who
voted to create it,32 but that it is a “work in progress” in
administering elections in a state with—how shall I put it?—a
colorful history in elections.

F. Re-Enfranchisement of Ex-Felons
This has been a quiet success story. During the convention,
there was little opposition33 to including a provision, Article III,
Section 2, that automatically restored the right to vote upon

28. ILL. CONST. art. III, § 5. See also V Record of Proceedings, SIXTH
ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 3665, 4341 (Aug. 6-31, 1970)
(describing the transfer from the secretary of state to the Board as producing a
“fairer and more reasonable way of canvassing election returns”).
29. ROBERT E. HARTLEY, PAUL POWELL OF ILLINOIS: A LIFELONG
DEMOCRAT 45 (1999).
30. See V Proceedings, supra note 28, at 4300-01 (discussing which
branch the board would lie under and outlining proponents’ views on why the
board should be evenly bipartisan and comparing it to other states’ bipartisan
election boards).
31. ILL. CONST. art. III, § 5.
32. See V Proceedings, supra note 28, at 4301 (commenting on the
reasoning behind the creation of the Board by characterizing Illinois as “one of
the most partisan administration[s] for elections.”)
33. See II Record of Proceedings, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 867, 1089 (May 1-21, 1970) (recording sixty-eight yeas and one
nay).
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completion of a penal sentence. 34 In this respect, the convention
was ahead of its time. Indeed, the 1970 Illinois Constitution was
one of the first constitutions to raise re-enfranchisement to the
level of a constitutional right.
It is not clear how many ex-felons exercise their restored
right. Upon release from prison, each ex-prisoner is given a list of
his newly restored rights, among them the right to vote.
As recent debates over “voter rights suppression” indicate,
many of those denied the right to vote in many states are exfelons. A disproportionate number of the ex-felons are AfricanAmerican males.35 Thus, the Illinois provision has been a pioneer
in extending the franchise to a class of Americans who do not
command much respect and do not have a strong lobby.

G. Powers of the Governor
This is best described as another work-in-progress. Article V
of the Illinois Constitution generally enhances the power of the
Governor to make appointments and remove appointees in
agencies responsible to him. 36 It is generally agreed that he can
reorganize state government by executive order more easily than
before.
Since the 1970 Constitution became effective in 1971, each
Governor has exercised his powers in his own way. Some saw
themselves as CEOs, some as statewide “cheerleaders,” some as
partners with the legislature, and some as “creators of public
policy.” Over time, each Governor seems to have learned how to
exercise his powers within his sphere of influence with more
decisiveness. Article V certainly gives him the tools to exercise
those powers.

H. Relationship of the Governor with the General
Assembly, Especially Regarding Vetoes
Again, this is a work-in-progress. Article IV of the 1970
Constitution re-formulated the relative positions of the Governor
and the General Assembly regarding legislation. Previously, the
Governor had only two vetoes, the standard ones of a total veto
(for all bills) and an item veto (for appropriations). Overriding a
gubernatorial veto was so rare that before Governor Ogilvie took
office in 1969, there were reportedly only two to four overrides.
34. ILL. CONST. art. III, § 2.
35. George Brooks, Felon Disenfranchisement: Law, History, Policy, and
Politics, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 101, 122 (2004) (explaining that
approximately 1.4 million black Americans, equivalent to 13% of all black
men, cannot vote because of felon disenfranchisement).
36. ILL. CONST. art. V.
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Overrides required a two-thirds vote of those elected to each house
of the General Assembly. Because at least one-third of the Illinois
House was almost sure to be of one party and no more than twothirds of the other party, it was almost impossible to override a
gubernatorial veto.
The convention made two significant changes. First, it
enhanced the Governor’s veto powers. It added a reduction veto to
the item veto, thereby enabling a Governor to eliminate a part of
an item of an appropriation while leaving the rest of the item
intact.37 It also made the Governor of Illinois a potential colegislator by allowing him an amendatory veto, a veto that
suggested changes in bills passed. 38 With these changes, Illinois
became the fourth state to have a Governor with all four vetoes.
The delegate who most strongly supported the creation of
the amendatory veto was Dawn Clark Netsch, a law professor who
had been the legislative aide to Governor Kerner in the early
1960s. At that time, most bills were passed in the last week of the
session in odd-numbered years, often on the last day of the
session, June 30th. In that pre-computer era, bills often
contradicted each other. The gubernatorial reviewing staff, which
she headed, was tasked with sorting through bills and
recommending which of the contradictory bills the Governor
should sign. She maintained that an amendatory veto would allow
a Governor to suggest changes, which the legislature could adopt
in the fall veto session, that would obviate the need to sign one bill
(making one legislator happy) and veto another bill on the same
topic (making another legislator unhappy).
The second significant change was the reduction of the
number of votes needed to override a total veto from two-thirds to
three-fifths.39 In 1970 approximately one-third of all Illinoisans
lived in Chicago, one-third in the suburbs, and one-third in the 96
“Downstate” counties. Given that none of the three areas was
entirely homogeneous, it was almost impossible to organize two of
the three areas to override a veto. The three-fifths extraordinary
majority is more doable; it allows for some defections by
mavericks.
The consequences of these two changes have been profound.
Almost every Governor has wielded his vetoes, especially the
amendatory veto, with a will unknown before. At least one
Governor, Dan Walker (1973-1977), used to announce amendatory
vetoes at a press conference called before he transmitted the veto
message to the legislature. I remember him saying to the press—

37. VII Record of Proceedings, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 1, 2702 (Dec. 8, 1969-Sept. 3, 1970).
38. Id.
39. III Record of Proceedings, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 1201, 1347 (May 22-29, 1970).
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and beyond that, the public—that he “was introducing a bill in the
legislature that would . . . .” In a sense, he was right. The
amendatory veto can force legislators to choose between the bill
they voted for and the new version, which the Governor may have
convinced their constituents is a better idea. In an age of
computerized bill drafting and bill reviewing, it is doubtful
whether there is still any real need for the amendatory veto.
On the other hand, the legislature has regularly overridden
gubernatorial vetoes. There have probably been more veto
overrides every year since 1971 than in the entire century of
history under the 1870 Illinois Constitution.

I. Special Legislation/The Single Subject
Rule/and the Enrolled Bill Rule
It is difficult to assess these changes. Article IV, Section 13
specifies that the courts may decide whether a bill is so narrow
that it constitutes “special legislation” favoring one group over
another group.40 Article IV, Section 8 specifies that a bill must be
confined to “one subject.”41 Speaking as one who has experience in
drafting bills, I have found that it can be difficult to satisfy both
requirements in the same bill.
For better or worse, the courts have deferred to the
legislature for both requirements. In the last decade of experience
with the requirements for legislation, say since the year 2000,
courts have rarely held a statute invalid because it was special
legislation or because it contained more than one subject. Perhaps
the legislators have learned how to craft bills more carefully.
However, it is more likely that the courts are more reluctant to
hold bills invalid and cause the confusion that inevitably results.
An important aspect of this discussion is the transfer from
the “journal entry rule” to the “enrolled bill rule.”42 Under the 1870
Constitution, courts could examine the journals of each house to
see if the legislators had complied with the constitutional
requirements for bill passage. Of course, most of the time the
journal simply reflected that the legislature had complied. After
all, the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate are
employees of their respective chambers. Would anybody expect
them to put down, “there were only two readings, not the required
three, of this bill?”

40. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13.
41. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 8.
42. See VI Record of Proceedings, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 1, 1386 (Dec. 8, 1969-Sept. 3, 1970) (describing how each system
functions and the weakness of the journal entry rule).
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The 1970 Constitution, Article IV, Section 8(d) substitutes
the enrolled bill rule for the journal entry rule.43 The courts cannot
look beyond the face of the bill after it is “enrolled”, i.e., the
presiding officers have certified that it was duly passed, to see if
the bill has complied with the constitutional requirements for
procedure.44 In practice, this has meant that courts do not consider
whether a bill has been “read” three times in each house before
passage. The single subject rule and the ban on special legislation
are not immune from challenge under the enrolled bill rule
because violations of those requirements are apparent on the face
of the bill.
In short, one has to wonder if any of the changes in
requirements for a bill have had any real impact.

J. The Change from Magistrates to Associate Judges
The shift in status, as well as in title, for certain judges of
the Circuit Court may have been significant. Under the 1962
Amendment to the Judicial Article of the 1870 Illinois
Constitution, which became effective in 1964, there were two
classes of trial court judges. The first class was the Circuit Court
judges, who were popularly elected for six-year terms. 45 The
second class was the Magistrates, who were appointed by judges in
the first class and who served “at their pleasure.”46
During the convention, some magistrates claimed that
people confused their title with the old “police magistrates,” a
lower class of judicial officer that had been abolished years before.
They wanted a change in title, and the nomenclature of “Associate
Judge” was chosen. Perhaps more significantly, they wanted job
security to give them a modicum of judicial independence. Serving
at the pleasure of the elected Circuit Court judges was insufficient.
There was little controversy over giving the new Associate Judges
four-year terms.
Approximately half of the trial judges in Illinois are elected
Circuit Court judges. The other half are Associate Judges. Article
VI, Sections 8 and 10 have combined to make a difference in the
second group.47 There is general agreement, in Cook County at
least, that the Associate Judges work as hard as their elected
counterparts and that they are of good quality. 48 Indeed, many, if
not most, of the elected Circuit Judges begin their judicial careers
as appointed Associate Judges.
43. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(d).
44. VI Proceedings, supra note 42.
45. ILL. CONST. 1870 art. VI, § 14 (1964).
46. ILL. CONST. 1870 art. VI, § 8 (1964).
47. ILL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 8, 10.
48. I Record of Proceedings, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 1, 69 (Dec. 8, 1969-Sept. 3, 1970).
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K. Powers of Cities and Counties (General
Purpose Governments)
The clarification, modernization, and expansion of the
powers of counties and municipalities (cities, towns, and villages)
has been a constitutional success story. 49 This is true even for
those without home rule powers: 101 counties and approximately
1,000 municipalities.50 It has been less successful in practice
because the political forces at work in many cities and counties
prevent change.
Article VII, Section 7 of the 1970 Constitution grants
significant powers to raise revenue, such as bonding, special
assessments, and special service areas, to counties and cities that
are not home rule units.51 However, reports indicate that many local
government officials in those cities and counties simply feel that they
cannot exercise those powers. The voters, who are also taxpayers, do
not want their officials to raise taxes or issue bonds. If reports are
accurate, many powers go unused despite claims by residents of
these cities and counties that they need more governmental services.
The powers are there; the political will is not.

L. Powers of Townships and Special Districts (Limited
Purpose Governments)
Again, this is a constitutional success story, but there is
little political will to re-structure, much less eliminate, most of
these specialized governments. Eighty-five Illinois counties have
townships.52 They are covered in Article VII, Section 5.53 It is
generally agreed that their functions almost completely duplicate
the functions of other governments. Yet, when Evanston tried to
49. James M. Banovetz, Illinois Home Rule: A Case Study in Fiscal
Responsibility, 32 J. REG’L ANALYSIS & POL’Y 79, 82 (noting that the Illinois
Supreme Court’s liberal construction of the powers granted to local
government in three cases: Kanellos v. Cook County, 53 Ill. 2d 161 (1972);
Sommer v. Village of Glenview, 79 Ill. 2d 383, 403 (1980); Rozner v. Korshak,
55 Ill. 2d 430 (1973)).
50. See Center for Governmental Studies, Illinois Home Rule: A Thirty
Year Assessment, Feb. 2001 Pol’y Profiles 1,1 (2000) (finding that as on
November 2000 elections, Illinois has 147 cities and villages with home rule
powers). Of those cities, seventy-seven gained such status by virtue of their
population being over 25,000 and seventy gained the status through
referendum. Id.
51. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 7.
52. See Illinois Ass’n of Cnty. Bd. Members, About Illinois Counties,
ILCOUNTY.ORG, http://www.ilcounty.org/news/22-2.html (last visited Dec. 20,
2014) (noting eighty-five of the 102 counties in Illinois operate under township
government).
53. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 5.
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eliminate The Township of Evanston, which is coterminous with
the City of Evanston, it faced opposition.54 It was not surprising
that the employees who would lose their jobs objected. But so did
residents who were used to having a “township assessment” on
their property tax bills and a “township assessor.”55 In 2014
Evanston finally succeeded.56 Most municipal officials do not even
try to abolish townships.
Special districts, of which Illinois has more than any other
state, are equally difficult to eliminate. 57 The Office of the State
Comptroller, which is supposed to receive annual financial reports
from each special district, admits that it is not completely sure
how many special districts there are. Article VII, Section 8 of the
1970 Constitution tries to limit the powers of special districts. 58
Efforts to eliminate them are almost always hopeless. Since 1971,
the legislature has created the largest special district, the
Regional Transportation Authority (RTA), which covers the six
counties in the northeastern part of the state and serves the public
transportation needs of more than eight million Illinoisans. 59 The
residents of those counties approved the creation of the RTA at a
referendum held in March 1974.60
Recently, it was reported that a small suburb west of
Chicago had abolished its fire protection district. It is not clear
how the city officials intend to have fires extinguished, but the
suburb apparently has contracted with a private ambulance
service to provide emergency medical services normally provided
by a fire department.
I think that the only way to eliminate the smaller special
districts will be to enact legislation that declares them without
revenue powers or governing powers five years after the bill
becomes law. In effect, it would be necessary to drive a stake

54. See Oliver Ortega, Evanston Residents Seek to Remove Advisory
Referendum on Township Dissolution from Ballot, THE DAILY NORTHWESTERN,
Feb.
22,
2012,
http://dailynorthwestern.com/2012/02/22/city/evanstonresidents-seek-to-remove-advisory-referendum-on-township-dissolution-fromballot (describing Evanston resident’s attempts to remove the dissolution
referendum from the ballot).
55. Id.
56. The Dissolution of Evanston Township. The Continuance of Critical
Services, CITY OF EVANSTON (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.cityofevanston.org/ne
ws/2014/03/the-dissolution-of-evanston-township-the-continuation-of-criticalservices.
57. See Illinois Ass’n of Cnty. Bd. Members, supra note 52, at Inside the
Courthouse: Special Districts (detailing some of the 3,145, the number
indicated by the 2002 census, special purpose districts in Illinois).
58. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 8.
59. Overview and History, RTACHICAGO.COM, http://www.rtachicago.
com/about-the-rta/overview-history-of-the-rta.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2014).
60. Id. at RTA Documents.
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through their hearts or they will keep on sucking the blood out of
their residents.

M. Intergovernmental Cooperation
This is a constitutional success story that has really worked
well. The Committee on Local Government of the convention
proposed Article VII, Section 10, which grants local governments
broad powers to enter into “intergovernmental cooperation
agreements” with other local governments, the State, and even
private entities.61 Here, the political will has often matched the
constitutional powers granted.
We do not know how many intergovernmental cooperation
agreements there are. However, the reports indicate great
satisfaction among both local government officials and their
constituents. When the emergency services hotline known as “911”
came into being, some small local governments found they could
not support the service on their own. They pooled their financial
and administrative resources into one “911/311” central service. In
short, this provision is a resounding, if unheralded, success.

N. Fiscal Process—Budgeting, Reporting,
Auditor General
This is a mixed success story. Article VIII of the Illinois
Constitution broke new ground by establishing a modern process
for an executive budget, appropriations by the legislative branch,
fiscal reporting, and, above all, legislative oversight by a new
officer called the Auditor General.62 In the interests of full
disclosure, I was the legal researcher who helped draft the final
text and report that created that article.
The Governor is supposed to present a balanced budget each
year, one in which his estimate of expenditures is not more than
his estimate of revenue to be raised.63 The General Assembly
cannot appropriate funds to be spent (appropriations bills) that
exceed the amount of revenue that it, in turn, estimates to be
available.64 It is generally agreed that neither Governors nor
legislatures have met these standards, at least if one refers to the
Generally Accepted Principles of Governmental Accounting.65 The

61. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 10.
62. ILL. CONST. art. VIII.
63. ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(a).
64. ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b).
65. See JACK RABIN, HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC BUDGETING AND FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT 330 (1983) (outlining the thirteen basic principles of
governmental accounting).
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demands for more services by Illinoisans create pressures that
elected officials find difficult to resist.
Article VIII, Section 4 mandates that there be uniform
systems of reporting and accounting.66 Because there are so many
local governments—and so many different kinds of them—it is
almost impossible to achieve uniformity. Therefore, there is no
way to compare the governments and their fiscal structures.
One of the true innovations of the 1970 Illinois Constitution
is the creation of the Office of the Auditor General in Article VIII,
Section 3.67 Elected by the legislators for a ten-year term, this
officer performs all legislative oversight of any entity, public or
private, that receives state funds.68 Although some entities
receiving public funds object to these annual audits, most have
come to accept them. To date, there have been only two Auditors
General: Robert G. Cronson and William G. Holland, the
incumbent. It is safe to say that no more than a hundred
Illinoisans recognize those names. However, their work, by all
accounts, has provided the legislative branch with invaluable
insights into the use of public funds.

V. CONCLUSION: WHERE INDEED ARE WE AT?
The Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention addressed
virtually all, perhaps all, of the significant issues placed before it
in 1969-1970. Many of the solutions proposed have operated as
expected. In some cases, such as reducing the voting age and
abolishing the death penalty, it took subsequent efforts to achieve
the goals. The voters used the limited citizens’ initiative to set in
motion the change in the election of House members that nearly
broke apart the convention.
Certain issues that the delegates could not resolve are with
us today. School funding, selection of judges, and redistricting the
legislature may be the most important. They admitted of no easy
solutions in 1970 and, despite what pundits say, they admit of no
easy solutions today. In that respect, Illinois is like the other
states, none of which seems to be able to come to acceptable
conclusions regarding those pressing issues of public policy either.
We at The John Marshall Law School are proud to present
this symposium issue on the 1970 Illinois Constitution. We hope
that readers will find new insights in the analyses contained in
these articles and will appreciate the efforts of Illinoisans since
1969 who have tried to make Illinois a better place to live.

66. ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 4.
67. ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 3(a)(b).
68. ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 3(a).
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